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3Debates exist regarding the strength of party power in the United States.1 At different 
times in American history, the strength and influence of parties have been supreme. At other 
times, the two major parties have been weak actors in the political landscape. This research 
delves into the current political situation in terms of party power. 
With Congressional majorities hinging on only a handful of seats, to a candidate it is as 
much what your party can do for you as what you can do for your party. By becoming a serious 
contender, you offer the party another seat in a sharply divided House of Representatives. In 
most cases, getting the opportunity to win a Congressional election depends on timing, financial 
backing, name recognition, ties to the community, personal and professional background, and 
other factors. In terms of elections, generally, the chance of beating an incumbent is slim, and for 
challengers, the aforementioned qualities often are insufficient to overcome a congressman’s 
reelection effort. 
During a time in American politics when almost every incumbent seeking another term in 
the U.S. House of Representatives is reelected, the electoral advantage that Members of 
Congress have is indisputable. However, open-seat elections are immune to this phenomenon. In 
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4fact, even as the political landscape provides fewer competitive races each election cycle, open-
seat elections remain divisive (Mayhew, 1992). Due to the powerful incumbent advantage, open-
seat House elections are the only examples that allow for a control such that all other forces 
acting on an election result can be examined.
This examination of the influences on open seat House races will provide an 
understanding of the effectiveness of House leadership in the current political scene. This study 
will allow for an evaluation of the ability of the leaders in Congress to improve their power 
standing, a judgment of the efficacy of leaders’ decisions to allocate funding, experience, and 
personal influence within specific races, and a comment on the current standing of the power and 
influence of national parties on a local level. 
Much investigation has been launched into different influences on open-seat House 
elections. Moreover, several studies have been conducted as to the influence of party leadership 
and/or party organizations on Congressional elections (Herrnson 1986, 2004; Medvic 2001). 
However, none has conducted an in-depth quantitative analysis of the influence of House 
leadership on open-seat races. While the theoretical framework for the study has been established 
through several different studies, in different forms, my research will conjoin the quantitative 
and qualitative efforts to produce conclusions regarding the effect of party leadership on House 
races. 
Competitiveness
The dynamic of open-seat elections gives political scientists a useful tool in electoral 
examination and analysis. One important aspect of understanding these races is their 
competitiveness. Unlike incumbent races, these elections, more often than not, give an 
opportunity to examine competitiveness. However, during every election cycle a portion of open-
5seat races are not competitive (Mayhew 1992). Competitiveness is vital to understanding the 
dynamics of an open-seat race. Some elections may see one candidate perform very poorly 
against another. This situation may occur for a number of reasons; however, the competitiveness 
of a specific district could be paramount. Bond, Fleischer, and Talbert (1997), while 
investigating candidate quality, examined the conditions present within a campaign. In terms of 
the likely competitiveness of a district, they measured the district vote for President in the past 
two elections and the vote for several offices over a period of several elections. This analysis
provided a clue to the partisan leanings of that given district. A district that overwhelmingly 
votes Republican in every election during every period measured may not provide the foundation 
for a competitive, open-seat race. 
Other factors weigh on the natural competitiveness of an open-seat House race. The 
“friends and neighbors” effect, whereby a geographically small district may provide candidates 
better name recognition, will naturally create a more competitive race (Miller, 1992). Because 
one of the most difficult problems facing challengers is voters’ failure to know them, the “friends 
and neighbors” effect may provide both candidates nearly equal name recognition in an open-
race (Herrnson, 2004).
Other Influences in Open-Seat Elections
Once incumbency advantage is removed, a better understanding of the influences in an 
election can be examined. Several investigations have been launched with regard to these 
influences. A Republican running for an open House seat on the same ballot as a popular 
Republican President seeking reelection may fare better (Bullock and Gaddie, 2000; Flemming, 
1995). This dynamic, known as the Presidential coattail effect, can be powerful enough to 
influence or even swing an election. On the other hand, the President can negatively impact 
6elections. Midterm elections almost always provide a net loss of seats in the House for the 
President’s party (Sabato, 2003). In many cases, voters become disenchanted with the Executive 
branch, and the midterm elections serve as a referendum on the President’s handling of his job. 
Flemming performed a statistical analysis of the positive influence of the Presidential coattails. 
While Sabato did not perform an historical-statistical study of midterms, his results, coupled with 
reasonable explanations for the exceptions, provide necessary qualitative support in the absence 
of quantitative data for the positive effect of Presidential coattails.
Among the many factors that allow House incumbents to be so successful, their ability to 
fundraise is one of the most important. The fundraising ability of incumbents and their 
subsequent ability to fund a dominating campaign directly contributes to their success (Bullock 
and Gaddie, 2000). In open-seat elections, a candidate’s success at fundraising contributes to his
or her success in the election (Bullock and Gaddie, 2000). As a result, money serves as an 
effective influence in open-seat House races. However, Bullock and Gaddie fail to examine the 
funding capabilities of party organizations.
While a candidate can fundraise among his constituents, one contributor with immense 
resources is the party organization. In the case of the House of Representatives, the party 
organizations are the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the National 
Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC). These two groups raise large sums of money 
nationally and are able to distribute these funds as they deem necessary and beneficial. Much 
research has been done concerning the influence of the party organizations on House elections. 
Herrnson (1986) analyzed candidates’ perceptions of the influence of party organizations. The 
study looks at whether candidates believe that the support they receive from the congressional 
campaign committees was effective or beneficial to their campaign. The Herrnson (1986) study, 
7however, examines the influence on all House elections, including those with incumbents. Yet
another study by Herrnson (2004) devoted specific attention to open-seat elections. However, 
this examination lacks a statistical analysis of such influences, while merely focusing on an 
explanation of the situation.
The DCCC and the NRCC also contribute to campaigns in ways beyond direct transfers 
of money. They also provide professional, trained consultants to assist candidates in their bids 
for a seat in the House of Representatives (Medvic, 2001). In this case, consultants are trained by 
the party organizations on specific matters such as media, fundraising, management, and 
grassroots/voter mobilization (Medvic, 2001). These consultants allow for campaigns to be run 
efficiently and professionally, with costs covered by the party organizations (Medvic, 2001; 
Kolodny, 1998). As a result of this assistance, many times at no cost to the campaign, campaign 
resources can be directed to other important areas. The use of consultants provided by the party 
organizations affords the campaigns a two-pronged benefit: a more professionally run campaign 
and more funds with which to work. This influence will put a campaign in excellent shape in 
fighting for the seat. 
Much of the analysis conducted as to the influence that the DCCC and the NRCC have in 
an election has been discussed as the influence of party organizations on the elections (Herrnson, 
1986; Herrnson, 2004; Medvic, 2001). However, Kolodny (1998) takes an important step away 
from the general trend in political science. He describes the influence as that of House 
leadership. This, I believe, is a very important distinction. Rather than designating the actions 
taken by the DCCC or the NRCC to be that of the party as a whole, he discusses it as the House 
leadership controlling the actions of the groups. This definition is far more accurate. While the 
leadership of the Republican Party as a whole does have contact with and a degree of influence 
8over the NRCC, the bulk of the influence will come from the Speaker, Majority Leader, and the 
Majority Whip (under the current make-up of the House of Representatives). For the Democrats, 
the Minority Leader and Democratic Whip wield intense influence over the DCCC. Furthermore, 
the chairmen of the DCCC and the NRCC exert a degree of their own power and take 
considerable direction from House leaders. Kolodny discusses and defines this power system. 
Explanations that “party organizations” control the influence on the House races are ambiguous, 
particularly when the chairmen are, at times, at the call of the Majority or Minority Leader s 
(Kolodny 1998).
Design
Much of the research into the effect of money on congressional elections investigates 
races with incumbents running (Alexander, 1992; Jacobson, 1978). These studies examine the 
effects of money on races that already have the powerful influence of incumbency. They look 
into the influence of spending by incumbents and challengers (Erikson and Palfrey, 1998). Also, 
researchers have investigated the effects of party spending on these races (Herrnson, 1986). All 
of these studies focus on House races generally. That research groups all House races under the 
same heading, while failing to capture the possible influences on specific types of races, such as 
open seats.
Open-seat House races serve as examples of races with their own dynamic that the 
aforementioned research fails to distinguish. These races naturally remove the advantage that 
incumbents enjoy, as no candidate is serving as a Member of Congress at the time of the 
election. Researchers have launched examinations into these open-seat races. Specifically, 
political scientists have investigated how disposable income in a state affects the types of 
9candidates and candidate quality in open-seat elections (Bond, Fleischer, and Talbert, 1997), as 
well as individual candidate spending (Gaddie and Bullock, 2000). Unfortunately, most research 
fails to investigate the influence of party spending on these open-seat races. Paul Herrnson 
(1986) did conduct a qualitative evaluation of the influence of party organizations. However, the 
study lacks a quantitative analysis of that influence.
This research tries to bridge the qualitative study of the influence of party organizations 
with the quantitative studies conducted  in most congressional research. The research focuses on 
party organizations, but I feel this label disregards a very important aspect of the electoral 
process. The House leadership dominates party organizations. This paper will refer to the 
influence of party organizations as the influence of leadership. This is an important distinction in 
understanding the system. Kolodny (1998) describes the leadership dominance over these 
organizations through both a history of the organizations and an analysis of their present-day 
function. While the term “congressional party organization” connotes participation of the entire 
caucus in decision-making, this is misleading. The reality is that the decisions of party 
organizations are made by a few high-ranking members of the party without necessarily having 
any regard for a consensus. 
There are many party organizations in this country, ranging from political action 
committees which are constructed and run by elected officials and politicos, to state 
organizations, to federal committees. The federal committees are, by far, the largest party 
organizations. These groups will be under analyzed in this project. For the Republican Party, the 
National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) serves as the cornerstone of party 
funding for House elections. This committee has been in existence for decades. Because of this 
power, consistency, and longevity, it serves as the most logical organization to examine in order 
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to understand the phenomena under focused, research conditions. In addition, the Republican 
National Committee (RNC) directs funding toward select House races. The Democratic 
equivalent of the NRCC is the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). The 
national parties charge these organizations not only with winning the races, but with funding 
campaigns. Furthermore, these organizations conduct independent efforts such as training 
individuals for professional campaign staff positions, recruiting candidates, and get-out-the-vote 
efforts (Kolodny 1998). Also, analyzing the national party organizations allows for a more even 
evaluation of influence across states. Because the national organizations can send money 
wherever it is necessary, they are far superior to state organizations as a target of analysis 
(Herrnson, 1986).
Leadership can fund campaigns in a few distinct ways. First, there can be direct 
contributions from the committees to the candidate’s campaigns. The next type of donation is 
independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate. These expenditures are spent on behalf of the 
candidate, but not coordinated in any directly communicated way with the campaign (Dwyre and 
Kolodny, 2003). This type of spending is of particular interest to this research because 
independent expenditures have no limit, as long as they are not coordinated with the campaign 
directly (Dwyre and Kolodny, 2003). It is in this context that the leadership can spend huge sums 
of money, as they see fit, in an attempt to win the House seat for their party. Because this 
spending can be unlimited, it has the prospect of exerting great influence on the outcome of these 
races. Candidates’ own campaigns are often scattered in terms of how to spend their money 
effectively and often emulate the ineffective methods of campaign spending practiced in other 
local campaigns (Kenny and McBurnett, 1997). Independent expenditures from the leadership 
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are allocated by well-trained experts during campaign efforts. These expenditures serve as 
effective and influential tools in the campaign process. 
Coordinated spending on behalf of a candidate is another type of spending that allows the 
leadership to expend large sums of money. In this case, the leadership is able to converse with 
the candidate’s campaign with regard to deciding how the money is to be spent. This type of 
spending is a very useful tool. While the effectiveness of independent spending comes with its 
professional distribution of funds, coordinated spending combines the effectiveness of leadership 
decisions on how best to use the money with the campaign’s discussion of the real, on-the-
ground demands that it faces. Coordinated spending gives the leadership even greater power over 
the process. Independent expenditures allow the leadership to oversee their own operations. 
Coordinated expenditures, however, give the leadership control over how the campaign is to use 
the funding that the leadership is supplying. Coordinated expenditures effectively give the House 
leaders positions of power and influence before the individuals are elected or arrive in Congress.
The last type of spending that I will analyze is spending directly against the candidate. 
Often this spending comes in the form of attack advertisements. Both parties have made use of 
this type of spending at varying times during the period covered by this study. As the amounts 
for this type of spending is, at times, in the millions of dollars on a single race, it is an important 
variable to measure.
Methods
Dependent Variable
In understanding the influences in congressional elections, a researcher must decide on 
the most effective way to measure the dependent variable. While the outcome of an election is 
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important, a simple win/loss analysis does little for understanding the true effect of the leadership 
on open-seat House races. The most effective measure of the dependent variable would indicate
the percent of the vote received by a candidate. This research defines the dependent variable as
the Republican candidate’s percent share of the two-party vote. This measure, as seen in Bullock 
and Gaddie (2000), explains the positive influence of Republican leadership spending, as well as 
the negative influence of the spending by the Democratic leadership. Because the study examines 
the two-party vote only, the negative influence of spending by the Democratic leadership on the 
Republican share of the vote is also the positive influence on the Democratic share of the vote. 
Thus, a simple sign reversal of the Democratic effect on the Republican vote will exemplify the 
Democratic effect on the Democratic vote.
Independent Variables
The key independent variable in this study will be the spending by party organizations. 
Types of expenditures can vary greatly. Data from the Federal Election Commission show that,
often times, party organizations will utilize several types of spending in races during the election 
cycles . Because of the variability of types and amounts of spending, it is important to see what is 
specifically influential. Thus, all spending will initially be analyzed separately in the following 
categories: DCCC direct spending, DCCC coordinated spending, DCCC independent spending, 
DCCC spending against the opposing candidate, NRCC spending against opposing candidate, 
NRCC direct spending, NRCC coordinated spending, NRCC independent spending, and RNC 
coordinated spending. In the model, these factors will function as distinct variables. Federal law 
mandates that, throughout the campaign, all candidates and organizations participating in the 
elections must file detailed spending and fundraising declarations with the Federal Election 
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Commission. The reports filed by the DCCC and the NRCC are an accurate, complete, and 
detailed report of the spending by the party organizations. 
Another important variable that this project will consider is that of leadership visits on 
behalf of candidates. These stops can serve to benefit a candidate in several ways. First, they will 
motivate the party base. This move will bring out the most important voters on Election Day. 
Second, such a visit will tell the voters that the most powerful members in the party have 
confidence in the ability of that candidate. Last, it provides a type of star-power. This star-power 
provides the type of name recognition that incumbents enjoy. While people may not be familiar 
with an up-and-coming congressional candidate, they may be better acquainted with the name of 
the Speaker of the House. And even if a voter is not familiar with the name J. Dennis Hastert, he
will still be impressed to hear that the Speaker of the House is appearing with the House 
candidate. 
With widespread communications readily available via television, newspapers and the 
Internet, most voters will learn of visits by members of the House leadership. The House 
Leadership will be defined as the Speaker of the House, the Majority and Minority Leaders, 
Majority and Minority Whips, and the chairmen of the DCCC and NRCC. These visits will be 
coded as simply the number of visits by this group, by party. As stated above, the press coverage 
of an event such as a visit by a member of the leadership of the United States House of 
Representatives is extensive. For this reason, the data will be taken from newspapers from the 
district. 
Control Variables
While this research removes the influence of incumbency from the House races, there 
still exist other variables of influence that must be considered. First, I will control for 
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competitiveness. If a district has an overwhelming majority of voters registered for one party, it 
could be an indication of a lack of competitiveness. However, candidates often encounter the 
difficulty of gaining a voting percentage commensurate with their party’s registration (Costantini 
and Dannehl, 1993). Similar studies that seek to control for the competitiveness of a given 
district have a dual-pronged approach for its determination. Bond, Fleischer and Talbert (1997) 
used this method first by examining one party’s share of the vote in the past five congressional 
elections. However, this subset is liable to include the incumbent advantage. Therefore, they 
examined the share of the vote for president, senator and governor over the past ten years. 
Through this process, they evaluated races across years and across seats for national and state 
offices. They combine this information, and data are then comparable across different 
congressional races. However, because of the redistricting subsequent to the 2000 census, 
eighteen states redrew their district lines. Furthermore, after the Texas legislature changed from 
Democratic to Republican control, there was a second redistricting of the Lone Star State in 
2002. As a result, using the aforementioned method for measuring competitiveness becomes 
difficult. 
To avoid this complication, I will use the Congressional Quarterly’s measure of the 
competitiveness of races. While it comes with the limitations of any secondary source, it will 
remain a concise, uniform, nationwide measure through a non-partisan source. Congressional 
Quarterly ranks races in seven categories: ‘Safe Democrat’, ‘Democrat Favored’, ‘Leans 
Democrat’, ‘No Clear Favorite’, ‘Leans Republican’, ‘Republican Favored’, and ‘Safe 
Republican’. For purposes of simplification, I will combine the ratings “favored” and “leans” for 
both parties into one category. The Congressional Quarterly ratings incorporate candidate 
fundraising and activeness, as well as past competitive elections in determining their rankings. 
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Also, these rankings take into account candidate quality, based on past elected office and name 
recognition within the district. The Congressional Quarterly competitiveness rankings will be 
built into the statistical model through a series of dummy variables in order to control for the 
effects of non-competitive and less competitive districts on the data.
Using the competitiveness rankings issued by Congressional Quarterly also provides a 
general benefit for investigation into open-seats. In the past, research has been constrained in its 
study of open-seat races by the post-census redistricting (Bullock and Gaddie 2000; Bond, 
Fleischer and Talbert 1997). However, this study removes the need to compare districts across 
time. Congressional Quarterly releases its competitiveness rankings for each election and is 
based on a set of variables influencing competitiveness on a race-by- race, year-by- year basis. 
This method of controlling for competitiveness also provides for a researcher to overcome this 
issues of a second redistricting, as was the case in the state of Texas in 2002. According to the 
guidelines set forth by Bullock and Gaddie (2000), the Texas races would need to be excluded.
In the end, a researcher can develop a longitudinal study to examine the long-term trends in open 
seats. The researcher is not constrained to eight- and ten-year segments of Congressional 
composition. 
Furthermore, campaign fundraising varies significantly both between races and within 
them. As a result, a candidate’s fundraising will be controlled. The fact that one candidate has 
raised far more than his opponent may factor directly into the amount of party money being sent 
to that race. The data used will be a candidate’s fundraising minus direct and coordinated party 
spending. It is important to examine campaign fundraising and not campaign spending. 
Candidates are armed with their opponents’ fundraising reports as filed with the FEC each 
month. The decision regarding campaign fund allocation is a type of anticipation game. One 
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campaign must anticipate what the other campaign can and will do. The significance is not what 
a campaign spends, but what a campaign can spend. A race in which fundraising is close may 
translate to a situation in which campaigns are far more careful as to how much to spend, when 
to spend, and what types of efforts on which to spend money.
Last, I will control for the year. In a study in which there are two election years under 
consideration, an interesting, and possibly telling result is whether one year was significantly 
beneficial to one party or another. Such information would give credence to any styles of 
leadership behavior that year. Further, it allows the researcher to examine the dynamic of that 
year and see what variables within the data may have caused such a situation. Or it would give 
the researcher the opportunity to look beyond the model to other variables that may lead to a 
change.
The leadership influence is seen through the leadership spending decisions and visits, and 
the resultant voting percentage will exhibit the effects of that influence. Similarly, candidate 
fundraising should exact an effect on the dependent variable. Because of all of this several 
hypotheses develop.
H1: Increased party spending increases that party’s percent share of the two-party 
vote.
When the leadership of one party directs spending in a race, that party’s
candidate, in terms of his share of the vote, should benefit. If the Republican leadership directs 
party spending in the race, the value of the dependent variable should increase. Likewise, if the 
Democratic leadership directs party spending, the value of the dependent variable should 
decrease.
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H2: Increased Leadership visits increase that party’s percent share of the two-party 
vote.
An increased number of leadership visits by a party should benefit that party’s
candidate’s share of the vote. Republican leadership visits should increase the value of the 
dependent variable. Visits by Democratic leaders should decrease the value of the dependent 
variable.
H3: Increased candidate fundraising should increase that candidate’s share 
of the two-party vote.
A Republican candidate’s fundraising should increase the value of dependent variable. 
Similarly, a Democratic candidate’s fundraising should decrease the value of the two-party vote. 
In the same sense, the candidate who benefits from a net gain in fundraising should benefit from 
a net increase in the two-party vote.
Case Selection
Choosing the cases under analysis is a complex process. Many factors beyond a simple 
definition of “open-seat races” need to be considered. The cases for this research will be defined 
as races for seats in the United States House of Representatives in which no current Member of 
Congress is seeking reelection. Also, both the Republican and Democratic parties must each field 
one candidate only. Third parties may also run in the cases, but cannot be the sole competitors of 
only one of the major parties. While the candidacy of third parties will not preclude a case, the 
analysis will not consider the role of the third party because the dependent variable measures the 
percent share of the two-party vote. The campaigns must occur during the general election cycles 
in the years 2002 and 2004. As a result, special elections will be excluded from the study. It is of 
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vital importance to exclude special elections. Special elections allow the parties to send atypical 
sums of money to those races because they are the only races requiring funding at that time. 
Budgetary constraints are naturally built into the model; the leadership is forced to decide exactly 
how much money can be spent on specific races, while factoring in the need to spend on other 
races. Special elections lack the budgetary constraints that occur during the general election. 
Also, this study includes races in which the incumbent runs in the primary and loses. This 
phenomenon occurs twice during the two election cycles. First, in the fourth district of Georgia 
in 2002, Denise Majette defeated incumbent Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney for the 
Democratic nomination. Second, in the 18th district of California in 2002, Dennis Cardoza 
defeated incumbent Congressman Gary Condit, also for the Democratic nomination. These cases 
are included because neither candidate in the general election enjoyed the advantage of 
incumbency.
Similar to the budgetary dynamics of special elections, the structure of Louisiana 
elections must also be considered. On the day of the general election in Louisiana, all races for 
the United States House of Representatives are primaries, in which every individual from each 
party can run. If no individual receives a majority of the vote, the highest vote-getters will face a 
run-off in December. If this occurs, the leadership can fundraise specifically for those races, and 
its spending decisions are based on one or a few campaigns. So, the Louisiana races that end in 
December run-offs maintain the same complications of special elections, and for this reason, 
they must be excluded.
The 2002 and 2004 election cycles had 82 open-seat races. The special elections in the 
second district of Hawaii, the 19th district of Texas, the sixth district of Kentucky, and at-large 
district in South Dakota (June 2004) must be excluded.  Among the remaining 78 races, some 
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need exclusion from this study. First, there were two races in which the candidates ran 
unopposed. In 2002, in the 17th district of Florida, Democrat Kendrick Meek ran without a 
Republican opponent, and in 2004, in the sixth district of Georgia, Republican Tom Price ran 
without a Democratic opponent. During the 2002 election, one open-seat race in Louisiana was 
decided in a December run-off. These cases will be excluded. During the 2004 election, the 
open-seat race in the first district of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal won a race against one other 
Republican and four Democrats. This case will be excluded. Also, the open-seat races in the third 
and seventh districts of Louisiana produced December runoffs and will not be analyzed in this 
study. Thus, the result is 74 races with 148 candidates being studied. Among the 74 races, 44 
took place in 2002 and 30 occurred in 2004. 
One more complication for case selection that will be kept under consideration is the 
influence a leader can have in his or her own state. In this case, the leaders are defined as the 
Speaker of the House and the House Majority and Minority Leaders. This consideration grows 
from the actions of House Majority Leader Tom Delay from the 22nd district of Texas. His 
dominant role in the 2002 second redistricting of his home state has raised state and federal 
investigations into the legality and ethics of those actions. Furthermore, the House of 
Representatives Committee on Ethics recently admonished the Leader for his actions involving 
the redistricting, while the United States Supreme Court ordered reconsideration of the legality 
of the drawing of the congressional districts (New York Times, October 18, 2004). As a result, I 
will evaluate whether the Texas districts considerably skew the data after the model is run. If so, 
all races from the states from which the Speaker and the Majority and Minority Leaders hail will 
be excluded. There were no open-seat races in the state of Missouri in 2002, from where then-
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (MO-03) hails. The 2002 race in the fifth district of Illinois 
20
would be excluded as the Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert hails from that state’s 14th
district. The House Majority Leader in 2002 was Dick Armey from the 26th district of Texas. As 
a result, the open seat races in that state’s fifth, 25th, 26th, and 31st districts would be excluded. In 
2004, the race in the third district of Illinois would be excluded as Dennis Hastert retained the 
gavel. Also the races in California’s third and 20th districts would be excluded, as Minority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi hails from that state’s eighth district. Further, the 2004 House Majority 
Leader Tom DeLay represents the 22nd district of Texas. As a result, that state’s races in the 
second, ninth, 10th, 11th, 24th, and 28th districts would be excluded
In addition, the 2004 election cycle provided a special case. In the fourth district of 
Georgia, Cynthia McKinney ran as the Democratic candidate as the incumbent, Denise Majette,
sought the open seat in the U.S. Senate. However, Cynthia McKinney held the fourth district seat 
from 1992-2002. This case will be included in the analysis. Cynthia McKinney did not enjoy the 
benefits of an incumbent congressperson during 2003 and 2004. And while she has name 
recognition, many other candidates in open-seat races do, as well. For example, William 
Janklow, the 2002 Republican nominee for the at-large seat in South Dakota, served as governor 
for four terms. 
I chose 2002 and 2004 for the data set because these years present several important 
characteristics. First, many media organizations and political analysts considered 2002 to be a 
year in which the Democratic Party could have won a majority of the seats in the House of 
Representatives. Many deemed the election the Democrats’ best chance to win back the House 
since the Republican Party took the majority in the 104th Congress. This so-called Democratic 
opportunity and Republican vulnerability would particularly motivate the parties to work toward 
a majority.
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Table 1
House Leaders
2002 2004
Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats
Floor Leader Richard Armey Richard Gephardt Tom DeLay Nancy Pelosi
Whip Tom DeLay Nancy Pelosi Roy Blunt Steny Hoyer
CCC Chair Tom Davis Nita Lowey Tom Reynolds Robert Matsui
Speaker Dennis Hastert ///////////////////////// Dennis Hastert /////////////////////////
Source: www.house.gov/
The two years under analysis provide an interesting setting for analysis. The two election 
cycles provide different House leadership, as seen in chart 1. This allows for an examination of 
different styles of leadership in terms of the direction of the party organizations, as well as 
different priorities. The dummy variable distinguishing the year will illustrate this distinction.
While the quantitative analysis in this study sheds light on the influence of leadership 
overall, it is important to understand some individual cases in order to appreciate the dynamics of 
specific races. As a result, after an analysis of the results of running the model, I will evaluate a 
few specific races in detail to understand the applied meaning of the data. It would be best to
choose one race in which the data seems to align well with the hypotheses. This qualitative 
analysis will show specific race dynamics and the ways in which the independent and control 
variables interact within those dynamics. Furthermore, another case study should interpret 
another instance in which the model failed to interpret the outcome of the race. This analysis, in 
evaluating the conditions of a specific race, could provide the research both with an 
understanding of which other variables may influence races and an example in which those 
variables become prominent. Thus, the case studies will be important to translate the statistical 
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interpretation of the political phenomenon to a qualitative, applied understanding of that 
phenomenon in the current political environment.
Results
The model for this experiment involves a dependent variable measuring the Republican 
Party share of the two party vote. The independent variables include a dummy variable reflecting 
the year, by which a 2002 race takes the value one and a 2004 race takes the value zero. Four 
dummy variables reflect the competitiveness of the race as ‘Safe Republican’, ‘Safe Democrat’, 
‘Leans Republican’, and ‘Leans Democrat’. For these variables, a value of one signifies that 
competitiveness designation. If all four dummy variables take the value zero, it reflects a 
competitiveness designation of ‘No Clear Favorite’. Five variables measure, in dollars, the 
Republican party spending: NRCC direct spending, NRCC independent spending, NRCC 
coordinated spending, NRCC spending against the Democratic candidate, and RNC coordinated 
spending. Four more variables measure the Democratic party spending: DCCC direct spending, 
DCCC independent spending, DCCC Coordinated spending, and DCCC spending against the 
Republican candidate. Two variables measure the number of visits by the House leadership for 
the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively. Last, two variables measure the fundraising 
by each candidate less the direct and coordinated party spending. 
The equation takes on the form of a basic regression equation:
Y =  + 1X1 + 2X2 +…18X18 + ,
where Y is the dependent variable,  is the constant,  nXn are the independent variables, and  is 
the statistical error. Multiple regression analysis was used to determine the results. Table 1 shows 
that the findings for party spending were not statistically significant. The lack of statistical 
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significance could come as a result of too few cases. A higher number of cases could improve the 
statistical significance of the results. 
The regression results do show statistical significance for the measures of 
competitiveness. The measures for competitiveness were very accurate. ‘Safe Republican’ and 
‘Safe Democrat’ labels had p values of .000. A designation of ‘Safe Republican’ will cause an 
increase of 11.232 in the dependent variable. More simply, a race designated ‘Safe Republican’ 
will give the Republican 11.232% more in the two-party vote. A race designated ‘Safe 
Democrat’ will decrease the Republican share of the two-party vote by 21.133%. This 
information is statistically significant and the signs of the coefficients are as expected. A race 
designated as favoring the Republican Party has a positive sign, thus increasing the Republican 
share of the two-party vote. Conversely, a race favoring the Democratic Party has a negative 
sign, decreasing the Republican’s share of the vote.
Further, the results show races designated as leaning toward a specific party are 
statistically significant. A race designated ‘Leans Republican’ was significant at a level p<.01. 
The data show such a designation is associated with an increase in the Republican share of the 
two- party vote of 6.793%. This finding aligns with expectations. The coefficient has a positive 
sign, which would indicate that a race favoring a Republican leads to an increase in the 
Republican share of the vote. Moreover, the value of the coefficient is less than that of the ‘Safe 
Republican’ designation. The ‘Leans Republican’ designations indicate that the Republican is
favored in the race, but should have a closer, more difficult race than those designated as ‘Safe 
Republican’. Similarly, races defined as ‘leans Democrat’ have a coefficient of -6.176 and were 
significant at a level p<.05. Again, this finding is as expected. The sign is negative, indicating 
that a race that favors a Democrat is associated with a decrease in the Republican share of the 
24
Table 13
Leadership in Open Seat House Races
Variable B T
Year 2.927 1.431
Safe Republican 11.232 3.168*
Safe Democrat -21.13 -5.664*
Leans Republican 6.793 2.582**
Leans Democrat -6.176 -2.034***
NRCC Direct ($10,000) -2.122 -0.688
NRCC Independent ($10,000) 0.0029 0.033
NRCC Coordin. ($10,000) -0.115 -0.188
NRCC Against  ($10,000) 0.0101 0.219
RNC Coordin.   ($10,000) -0.354 -1.203
DCCC Direct ($10,000) 0.6 0.018
DCCC Independent. ($10,000) -0.059 -0.846
DCCC Coordin. ($10,000) 0.39 1.535
DCCC Against ($10,000) 0.271 0.836
Republican Ldrshp. Visits -1.439 -1.321
Democratic Ldrshp. Visits 0.948 0.75
Republican Fundraising 6E-05 -0.004
Democratic Fundraising 0.0046 -0.466
Constant 54.514
R2 0.835
Adjusted R2 0.781
* p<.001 (one-tailed test)
** p<.01 (one-tailed test)
*** p<.05(one-tailed test)
3 A copy of the data table for this project fills an area over nine square feet in area. As a result, it is not 
included with this material. The data table is available upon request from the author. Further, the sources 
used in the data collection include dozens of newspaper articles, several hundred reports from the Federal 
Election Commission. As the documents were not directly cited within the text, they were not included in 
the Works Cited Page. A list of sources used in this study or a copy of the documents utilized in 
compiling the data for the study are also available from the author per request.
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two-party vote. Moreover, the actual coefficient for a ‘Leans Democrat’ race is less than that of a 
‘Safe Democrat’ race.
In fact, calculating the means of the voting results by competitiveness designations 
further exemplifies the accuracy of the competitiveness variables. As seen in Table 2, increasing 
competitiveness leads to a lower percent of the vote for the candidates, and of course, a lower 
margin of victory for the winning candidate. The ‘Safe’ designations resulted in a substantially 
higher percent of the vote share for the party favored. The most competitive races designated ‘No 
Clear Favorite’ had an average vote margin of 4.400%. Furthermore, of the 62 races in which 
one party was favored (either ‘Safe’ or ‘Leans’), the party favored won 61 of the races. The one 
exception was the race in the 11th district of Georgia in 2002. The race, designated as ‘Leans 
Democrat’, sent a Republican to Congress. In that race, the margin of victory was only 3.28%. 
Table 2
Voting Means by Competitiveness Designation
Competitiveness Designation Republican share of   2 party vote Vote Margin (%)
Safe Republican 65.82 31.64
Safe Democrat 37.104 25.792
Leans Republican 58.89 17.78
Leans Democrat 46.53 6.94
No Clear Favorite 52.2 4.4
Source: Congressional Quarterly
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What results is that the competitiveness rankings issued by Congressional Quarterly are 
highly accurate predictors of the vote. For races labeled ‘Safe Republican’, ‘Safe Democrat’, and 
‘Leans Republican’, the Congressional Quarterly rankings for competitiveness were perfect 
predictors of the outcome of the election. The designation ‘Leans Democrat’ predicted 17 of 18 
races correctly, for an accuracy of over 94%. A commonly referenced measure of 
competitiveness is the Bond and Fleischer (1997) study. In addition to the limitations imposed by 
redistricting, this study encounters more theoretical constraints. Past voting fails to take into 
account several race-specific dynamics that can drastically affect an election. For example, 
although the incumbent effect is removed, an individual who served as a state legislator in the 
past will have name recognition, at least, within a portion of his district. Most importantly, an 
individual who held past elected office, even over a small constituency in a congressional 
district, has a fundraising base. Moreover, the experience of political fundraising puts one at an 
advantage in a race against an opponent who has no experience. Congressional Quarterly takes 
fundraising and fundraising ability into account. Part of their criteria involves how well a 
candidate fundraised during the year. Moreover, the candidates’ standing in the district is 
measured by how strong of a candidacy they are maintaining, given the district composition and 
given the time. 
Simply examining the party voting in past elections, particularly for President, can be a 
very inaccurate way of accounting for competitiveness in a district. For example, if a Democratic 
candidate for President is a pro-choice, anti-death penalty, tax-and-spend liberal, a conservative 
district would not deliver a large percentage of the vote for that candidate. However, a 
Democratic candidate for the House of Representatives who is a pro-life, pro-death penalty, 
proponent of low taxes and smaller government will, most likely, wage a more effective, 
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competitive campaign against a Republican opponent. However, a measure that examines the 
vote for President may explain the type of candidate who would be more likely to win if the 
candidate is measured on a liberal-conservative continuum. However, a discussion of the party 
favored to win, based on that criteria, would not necessarily be accurate. 
Because candidates from either party can occupy such a wide spectrum of views, simply 
labeling competitiveness based on party is naïve. This is an age when the term “moderate” is
often times a euphemism for conservative Democrat or liberal Republican. Thus, defining party 
performance in a House election based on the statewide or nationwide ideological position of the 
party leaves open the likelihood of error. The Congressional Quarterly rankings of 
competitiveness take into account the necessary dynamics that influence races, on a case by case 
basis. The rankings issued within weeks of the election are not intended to be used from year to 
year as a measure of the district’s leaning. This distinction is important. The Bond and Fleischer 
(1992) study attempts to predict the competitiveness of a race without knowledge of the 
candidates. While this measure is the most accurate means toward a specific, predictive end, that 
end is only useful if the Republican and Democratic candidates are ideologically aligned with the 
national party and are on an equal footing in terms of fundraising ability, experience, and all 
other dynamics that influence their ability to function competitively in the race. Congressional 
Quarterly, however, tacitly accepts that races are so individualistic and dynamic that one cannot 
possibly comprehend their competitiveness with a high degree of accuracy without knowing the 
candidates and their abilities.
The Congressional Quarterly rankings of competitiveness include, as part of the criteria, 
a candidate’s fundraising. As a result, the model should experience some degree of colinearity 
between the competitiveness variables and the candidate fundraising variables. To test this, I 
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removed the competitiveness variables and reran the regression to see if there would be a change 
in the output with regard to candidate fundraising. As the results show, the fundraising less the 
coordinated party spending is now statistically significant. The Republican fundraising is 
significant with a p-value less than .001 and Democratic fundraising has a p-value less than 
.0001.
Table 3
Leadership in Open Seat House Races without Competitiveness as 
a Variable
Variable B T
Year 3.323 0.845
NRCC Direct ($10000) 3.829 0.796
NRCC Independent ($10000) 0.05607 0.334
NRCC Coordinated ($10000) 0.581 0.501
NRCC Against       ($10000) -0.0326 -0.38
RNC Coordinated   ($10000) -0.168 -0.331
DCCC Direct ($10000) -0.91 -0.214
DCCC Independent ($10000) 0.00226 0.017
DCCC Coordinated ($10000) -0.828 -1.847*
DCCC Against       ($10000) 0.06151 0.1
Republican Leadership Visits 0.994 0.489
Democratic Leadership Visits -0.0408 -0.018
Republican Fundraising 0.07049 3.256**
Democratic Fundraising -0.0599 -3.599**
Constant 47.635
R2 0.33
Adjusted R2 0.199
* p<.05 (one tailed test)
**p<.01 (two tailed test)
Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients are as expected and are coherent with past results. The 
Republican candidate fundraising has a positive sign, showing that greater Republican 
29
fundraising is associated positively with the Republican vote. Similarly, the Democratic 
candidate’s fundraising has a negative sign, meaning an increase in a Democrat’s fundraising 
will decrease the value of the dependent variable and increase the Democrat’s share of the two-
party vote.
The data show that an increase of $10,000 in a Republican candidate’s fundraising leads 
to an increase of .07049% of that candidate’s vote. The Bullock and Gaddie (2000) study 
examining open seat House races looked at candidate spending. They found similar results. 
Measuring candidate spending at a unit of $100,000, they found a $100,000 increase in 
Republican spending led to an increase of 1.11% of the Republican’s share of the two-party vote. 
Comparably, a $100,000 increase in Republican fundraising in this study results in a .7049% 
increase in the Republican’s share of the vote. 
Democratic  fundraising was also statistically significant with a p-value of less than
.0001. In this case, a $10,000 increase in a candidate’s fundraising will result in a decrease in the 
value of the dependent variable by .05994. In other words, that $10,000 increase will decrease 
the Republican share of the two-party vote by .05994%. To set the units equal to compare this 
study to the Bullock and Gaddie (2000) study, a $100,000 increase in the fundraising of a 
candidate would result in a .5994% decrease in the Republican’s share of the two-party vote. The 
Bullock and Gaddie (2000) study found a $100,000 increase in a Democrat’s spending would 
result in a .79% decrease in the Republican share of the two-party vote. 
In a sense, a Republican’s fundraising is worth more than a Democrat’s fundraising. If a 
Republican and a Democrat both raise the same amount in a race, for example $1,000,000, a 
Republican will benefit by an increase of 7.049% of the two-party vote. The Democrat will 
decrease the Republican’s share of the vote by 5.994%. Thus, the Republicans have a net
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increase of 1.055%. This situation holds only if both candidates spend the same amount. 
However, on average, for both election years, the Republicans raised $1,182,060 and the 
Democrats raised $953,195. Based on these fundraising numbers, a Republican would see an 
increase of 8.33% of the vote, and the Democratic fundraising would decrease the Republican 
vote share by 5.71%. The average Republican netted a 2.62% vote gain from the fundraising 
advantage alone. 
The result is that in order to keep up and not lose any ground in the vote, for every 
$10,000 that the Republican candidate fundraises, the Democrat needs to raise $11,760. The 
Democrats needed to raise 17.60% more than Republicans to keep pace in terms of the vote. In 
2002 and 2004, on average, the Republicans raised 24.01% more than Democrats. In effect, the 
Democratic candidates fell far behind Republican candidates both in terms of fundraising and 
effective fundraising. In order for Democrats to have garnered the same effect on the dependent 
variable they would have needed to raise 41.61% more than they had in the two years studied.
Among the party spending variables, the coordinated spending by the Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) becomes statistically significant with a p-value < 
.05 with a one tailed test once the competitiveness variables are removed. Sensibly, this variable 
becomes significant when the competitiveness variables are removed as coordinated party 
spending is a expenditure coordinated with the campaign. However, this variable would be 
included in the fundraising of a campaign in Congressional Quarterly’s determination of 
competitiveness. The coefficient has a sign consistent with the party spending hypothesis (H1) 
that increased Democratic Party spending leads to an increase in the Democratic share of the 
vote or, conversely, a decrease in the Republican share of the two-party vote. The data show a 
finding of particular interest. An increase of $10,000 in DCCC coordinated spending will result 
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in a decrease of the dependent variable by .828. In other words, for every $10,000 the DCCC 
expends in coordinated expenses, the Democrat’s share of the two-party vote increases by 
.828%. This is a significant finding. In the past, it was assumed that no party spending had a 
relevant effect on the vote. This study shows that the Democratic Party’s coordinated spending 
has an effect stronger than that of fundraising. More clearly, for a Democratic candidate’s 
fundraising to have the same effect on the dependent variable that $10,000 of DCCC coordinated 
spending has, the candidate would need to raise over $138,138. 
Similarly, the DCCC coordinated spending is far more effective than a Republican 
candidate’s fundraising. Again, DCCC coordinated spending decreases the Republican share of 
the two party vote by .828%; a Republican candidate’s fundraising increases his share of the vote 
by only .07049%. What this means is that for every $10,000 in DCCC coordinated spending, a 
Republican candidate needs to raise over $117,463 to affect the dependent variable to the same 
extent. In the same sense, the effect on the dependent variable from every $10,000 in a 
Republican candidate’s fundraising can be equally offset by only $852 of DCCC coordinated 
spending. In 2002 and 2004, the average DCCC coordinated spending per race was $14,916. A 
Republican candidate would need to raise over $175,202 to offset the effect of the Democratic 
spending on the dependent variable.  However, leadership directed DCCC coordinated spending 
was only used in 47 races. Among those 47 races, the average DCCC coordinated spending was 
$23,484. The effect of that spending on the Republican share of the two-party vote was a 
decrease of 1.944%. In order to offset this decrease in the vote, the Republican candidate would 
need to raise $275,784.
Overall, the Republican candidate’s fundraising, on average, was a reasonably effective 
counter to the DCCC coordinated spending. The average net gain in fundraising was $228,865
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advantaging the Republican candidate. This benefited the Republican’s vote by 1.61%. As the 
average DCCC coordinated spending of $14,916 decreased, the Republican’s share of the vote 
increased by only 1.24%. As a result, the Republican’s net gain in fundraising, accounting for the 
DCCC coordinated spending, gives the Republican candidate a net vote gain of 0.37%. 
The question becomes: what does a candidate need to do to win a race, given these 
statistically significant spending data? In order for the average Republican to win, for every 
$10,000 that a Democratic candidate fundraises, the Republican candidate must raise just over
$8,503, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, for every $10,000 in DCCC coordinated spending that a 
Democrat receives, the Republican must raise another $117,463. Such fundraising is the 
necessary minimum level to offset the effects on the dependent variable due to Democratic 
fundraising and spending efforts. 
In terms of fundraising, a Democratic candidate faces more of an uphill battle. Whereas 
in terms of simple fundraising, the Republican candidate only needs to raise 85.03% of the 
Democrat’s fundraising, a Democrat must raise 17.60% more than the Republican. In other 
words, for every $10,000 that the Republican raises, the Democrat needs to raise more than 
$11,760 to see a net gain in the vote share. For every $10,000 in Republican candidate 
fundraising, the Democrat must receive $852 in DCCC coordinated spending to maintain the 
vote. 
Like candidate fundraising, DCCC coordinated spending is a statistically significant 
variable when the competitiveness variables are removed. This change in significance can easily 
be accounted. The Congressional Quarterly determination of the competitiveness of a House 
race is determined, in part, by the money raised by each candidate. In the model used in this 
study, the candidate fundraising variable is defined as the total fundraising by a candidate less 
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the direct and coordinated party spending. I made this adjustment to the fundraising variables to 
avoid a double-counting of data because of the introduction of individual party spending 
variables. Because the competitiveness variables account for coordinated party spending, DCCC 
coordinated spending would have a relationship with those competitiveness variables. This 
colinearity within the model that includes the competitiveness variables would not be an issue 
when those variables are removed. As a result, the shift to statistical significance for the DCCC 
coordinated spending variable is accounted. 
One might ask why DCCC Coordinated Spending affects the vote so much more than 
does individual candidate spending. As discussed above, party funds are allocated by 
organizations that are highly professional, specialized campaign operators that understand the 
most effective and efficient ways to spend in a race. Coordinated spending combines that 
efficiency with campaign coordination. This coordination allows for the campaigns to inform the 
party organizations exactly where they need help, financially. In addition, as every district, 
arguably may have different demands, the combination of professional fund allocation and 
specific district experience will make Coordinated Spending a highly effective tool in a given 
race.
One question that naturally evolves from this statistical outcome is why the other 
variables still lack statistical significance even after the competitiveness variables are removed?
More important, why do the other coordinated spending variables (that from the NRCC and the 
RNC) fail to gain statistical significance after the removal of the competitiveness variables?
Table 4 sheds some light on this finding. The DCCC coordinated spending was used in more 
races than any other type of spending in the study. DCCC coordinated spending was used in 47 
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races or 63.5%. The next highest type of spending was NRCC independent spending. NRCC 
independent spending was used in only 30, or 40.5%, of races. More significantly, DCCC
Table 4
Open Seat Races and Spending
Type of Spending
Number of Races 
Using Such 
Spending
Percent of 
Races*
NRCC Direct 42 56.8% 
NRCC Independent 30 40.5%
NRCC Coordinated 10 13.5%
NRCC Against 12 16.2% 
RNC Coordinated 26 35.1%
DCCC Direct 37 50.0%
DCCC Independent 10 13.5%
DCCC Coordinated 47 63.5%
DCCC Against 5 6.8%
* Based on N=74
Source: FEC
Coordinated Spending was, by far, the most frequently used type of coordinated spending. 
NRCC coordinated spending was only used in 10 races or 13.5% of races. RNC coordinated 
spending was used in 26 or 35.1% of races. The other types of coordinated spending are only a 
fraction of that used by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. These significantly 
lower numbers of data for the other spending could be an explanation for their lack of statistical 
significance. 
One theory mentioned above centered on the idea that some House leaders may exercise 
greater influence in their own home state. The model was run excluding the 2002 races in the 
fifth district of Illinois (the Speaker’s home state) and the races in Texas’ 5th, 25th, 26th, and 31st
districts of Texas (the Majority Leader’s home state). There were no open seat races in the 
Minority Leader’s home state, Missouri, in 2002. In 2004, the races in the third and 20th districts 
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of California (the Minority Leader’s home state), the third district of Illinois (the Speaker’s home 
state) and the ninth, 11th, 24th, and 28th districts (the Majority Leader’s home state) were all 
excluded. The model excluding the races in the home states of the three highest ranking leaders 
in the House produced very similar results (not included). The same variables remained 
significant, while no more became significant. The regression coefficients changed minimally, 
and I determined the Leaders exercised no greater effect in their home states. 
Leadership visits did not show a statistical significance when using the full model that 
includes the competitiveness variables. Moreover, the model that removes the competitiveness 
variables also shows a lack of statistical significance. The individual candidate fundraising 
variables experienced colinearity with the competitiveness variables because Congressional 
Quarterly based part of its criteria on a candidate’s fundraising through a good portion of the 
campaign. The leadership visits, however, are not explicitly mentioned as part of the criteria for 
the competitiveness determination. Moreover, even if leadership visits are factored in, the data
for the rankings is compiled several weeks in advance, as the rankings are issued at least a week 
before the election. Thus, leadership visits occurring closer to Election Day would not be 
factored into the consideration of CQ competitiveness rankings. Thus, colinearity would not be 
an issue if many leadership visits occurred closer to the election. Thus, the removal of the 
competitiveness variables would not result in leadership visits becoming statistically significant 
because of any relationship among independent variables. 
As Table 5 shows, many of the leadership appearances were in fact made during the last 
month before the election. For many states, the campaign season lasts from March until the 
beginning of November. During this period of eight months, House leaders made 75 appearances
in 2002 and 2004. However, in the last month before the 2002 election, House leaders made
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Table 5
Leadership Visits by Year
Year Republican Democrat Total Total in Last Month*
2002 41 12 53 23
2004 13 9 22 10
Total 54 21 75 33
* 2002: All visits on or after October 5th; 2004: All visits on or after October 2nd
43.4% of their visits. Similarly, in the last month before the November 2, 2004, election, House 
leaders made 45.5% of their visits to districts on behalf of their party’s candidates. Overall,
House leaders made a full 44.0% of their visits in the last month before the polls opened. 
Thus, because a large percentage of leadership visits occurred very late in each election 
cycle, those data could not factor into the CQ competitiveness rankings accurately. If such 
appearances were considered, the information would be largely incomplete. As a result, any 
possible change in the level of statistical significance in the variables measuring party leadership 
appearances cannot be attributed to an overlap in the information being measured by the 
competitiveness variables. 
The leadership visit variables failed to attain statistical significance. Appearances by the 
House leadership compose a complex variable both in terms of its effect and its measurement. 
First we will discuss measurement. This experiment first examined the leadership variables by 
simply measuring the number of appearances en bloc by the Speaker, the floor leaders, the whips 
and the congressional campaign committee chairs. The measurement was established by 
publication in district newspapers, in order to gauge the effect on the voters. The model used 
above operationalizes the variables in this way. After finding no statistical significance, I 
examined the data as a dummy variable, coding a visit by any of the members of the leadership 
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as one and no visit as zero (not included). The same result, a lack of statistical significance, 
occurred by measuring the leadership visits in this way. 
A simple count of visits by House leaders is the most effective and efficient way of 
measuring such a dynamic. However, leadership appearances are more complex. First, leadership 
appearances affect one district differently than they affect another. For example, a conservative, 
rural Southern district that runs a moderate (conservative) Democrat faces different constituent 
relations to the national party than does a more liberal, urban Northern district. A visit by House 
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi to the former district may result in a negative effect on the 
Democratic candidate who seeks to bring conservative values both to the Democratic Party and 
to Congress. In this case, the failure of a leader to visit a district can be significantly positive to 
such a candidate. What would function most effectively for that candidate is to have a fellow 
conservative Democrat, well-established locally, statewide or nationally to appear on his behalf. 
This dynamic forces another complication for the measurement of this variable.
The determination of who qualifies as a House leader is a judgment call for a researcher. 
One must weigh parsimony against explanatory accuracy. In this study, I focused on seven 
House leaders who are charged with the day-to-day operations of the House of Representatives, 
both legislatively, administratively, and in terms of inter- and intraparty relations. These seven 
individuals, elected by their peers, maintain positions of authority over every member of the 
House or, at least, every House member of their respective party. Other individuals wield 
significant amounts of power within the House of Representatives. Committee chairmen and 
ranking members maintain a good deal of prestige and power; combined, they number 42. In 
addition, senior House members from state delegations can influence races within those states. 
Furthermore, any established House member can serve as a leader, in some sense, to an adjacent 
38
or nearby district. Female Members of Congress may function as leaders in front of certain 
women’s rights groups. African-American or Latino congressmen may serve a leadership-type 
role in certain urban districts. What results is a situation in which, given a certain set of 
circumstances, almost any incumbent member of the House of Representatives can function as a 
House leader. The seven leaders used in this experiment are the best choices for measuring this 
variable. They attain national acclaim by virtue of their office. Their leadership role is not issue-
oriented as would come with a chairmanship, nor is it localized according to proximity of 
districts. Instead, they are the most widely-recognized, clearly-defined leaders in the Congress 
and are the only individuals who such a variable should evaluate, in order for that variable to be 
efficient and manageable. 
A visit by a member of the leadership of the House of Representatives brings a seemingly 
unmatched set of benefits to a race. First, a visit by a leader motivates that party’s base within the 
district. Such a visit functions as a Homecoming Rally for the political Fall classic. Seeing an all-
star from Washington, DC, whirl into town in a dark-colored vehicle, flanked by guards in order 
to give an address about the issues that define that party during that election is a thrill to the 
political base. The party base is a vital asset for a candidate. As candidates in competitive races 
tend to move toward a more moderate position to attract the most voters, a visit by a party leader 
offset any discouragement the party base develops as a result of such a moderate shift.
Next, a visiting House leader legitimizes the candidate on whose behalf he is visiting. 
While a candidate may be run by the state party committee unopposed or come to win the 
nomination through a hard-fought primary battle with a fellow party member, a candidate may 
face one of two situations. In the first case, the candidate may lack general name recognition 
among most of the electorate, but was chosen for fundraising capacity or personal wealth. In the 
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latter case, a little less than half of the party’s voters in the district may be dissatisfied with the 
candidate and be unmotivated to visit the voting booth, as they feel his primary opponent was the 
better candidate. A leader’s visit to the district on behalf of the candidate tells the party and the 
district as a whole that this candidate is what the national party is seeking. And more 
importantly, the visit is a statement from the legislative leaders in the House of Representatives 
that they are ready and willing to work with this candidate. This tacit approval tells voters that 
the candidate has a legitimate chance of influencing, molding, or producing policy and 
legislation that is meaningful and beneficial to that district. While the failure of a leader to 
appear on behalf of a candidate may occur for a variety of reasons (e.g., lack of competitiveness, 
the possible negative effects of a visit), a lack of such national attention can convey to the voters 
that the House leadership is not motivated or looking forward to working with this candidate. 
Next, similar to the party base motivation, a leader’s visit can motivate an ideological 
base to vote. In any race there are hundreds of issues that matter to certain groups of individuals. 
However, in most elections there exist certain issues and concerns that are more general, that 
matter to a huge percentage of the electorate. For example, Social Security reform and national 
and international security were two of the central issues in the minds of voters in 2002 and 2004. 
While these issues have obvious local effects, they are handled nationally. Such issues are so 
divisive that voters understand that one man or woman from one congressional district will do 
little to solve the problem. Because of this sentiment, voters can become apathetic. A visit by a 
House leader, an individual in charge of setting the legislative agenda, can motivate an 
individual, independent of their party preference, who holds the same beliefs on these issues. At 
certain times in history, these issues can be so dominant in an individual’s interests (i.e., they 
involve life, personal security, or the safety of their posterity) that people are willing to listen to 
40
whichever individual promotes an effective, logical, and clear way to solve the problem. This 
search for an answer to national issues can cross party lines. What it means is that the leader, 
with a star-like, national, political power who discusses the solutions to these issues may 
motivate a certain sect of the electorate not only to vote in the November election, but to vote for 
that party’s candidate. 
With regard to leadership visits during the 2002 and 2004 open seat House races, a 
qualitative analysis of the data displays very telling information about the priorities and 
processes of the Democratic and Republican parties. Examining the visitation activity of the 
Republican party shows a dedication to the open-seat races. As Table 6 shows, the four 
Republican leaders visited 37 of 74 races—exactly 50%—during the two election cycles. The 
Table 6
leaders visited these 37 races, a combined 54 times. These data ignore the other incumbent-races 
that the House leadership visit during these election cycles. So, the true number of overall visits 
Visits by House Leadership
Competitiveness # of Races
# of Races 
with 
Leadershi
p Visits
# of Races 
Visited by 
a 
Republican 
Leader
# of Visits 
by a 
Republican 
Leader
# of Races 
Visited by 
a 
Democratic 
Leader
# of Visits 
by a 
Democratic 
Leader
Safe Republican 19 9 9 10 1 2
Safe Democrat 15 2 2 2 0 0
Leans 
Republican 19 13 11 18 3 4
Leans Democrat 9 6 5 8 3 3
No Clear 
Favorite 12 10 10 16 6 12
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is actually higher. What this data shows is that the Republican party sees the visitation of their 
leaders to open-seat races as a very important part of the campaign season. While the regression 
cannot confirm a relationship between leadership visits and the vote, the Republican Party 
obviously believes it makes a difference. The leadership takes the time and effort to travel to the 
races, supports individuals, and, at least to some extent, addresses the issues vital to that 
candidate’s campaign. They spend valuable resources that could be sent elsewhere to speak on 
behalf of these district nominees. Thus, they must believe in the benefits to the party. 
The data also show that the leadership visits are not just meaningless political actions, 
used to thank the candidates for running under the GOP banner. While the data show that the 
House leadership visited 50% of open seat House races, visits were not equally dispersed across 
different competitiveness rankings. Equal dispersion across the rankings would give credence to 
a theory that the visits were meaningless political ploys. Instead, the data show that among the 
three most competitive types of races (those labeled ‘Leans Republican’, ‘Leans Democrat’, and 
‘No Clear Favorite’), the Republican Party leadership visited 26 of 40 races or 65%. This marked 
increase from the overall percentage of visits shows the importance of these visits to competitive 
races. Furthermore, of the 12 races labeled ‘No Clear Favorite’, the Republicans visit ten of them 
or 83.3%. Under the three most competitive rankings, of the 26 races visited by the Republican 
House leadership, they made 42 visits. Similarly, 16 Republican visits were made to the ten races 
labeled ‘No Clear Favorite’. To compare, the Republican leadership visited 11 of 34 or 32.4% of 
races labeled ‘Safe’. Only 12 visits were made to these 11 races. Thus, the data in Table 6 are 
clear; the more competitive a race, the more likely a district is to be visited by the Republican 
House leadership. 
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The Democrats showed a less enthusiastic effort in making leadership appearances. 
Among the 74 open seat House races in 2002 and 2004, the Democrats only visited 13 races. 
This performance is considerably low compared to the Republican efforts. These 13 races 
account for only 17.57% of the races. The Republicans visited 50% of races. To compare, the 
Democrats visited only 35.14% of the number of races visited by the Republican House 
leadership. 
Similar to the Republican leadership visits, the Democratic leaders visited more 
competitive races with higher frequency. Twelve of the 13 races visited by the Democratic 
leadership occurred in the three most competitive types of races: ‘Leans Republican’, ‘Leans 
Democrat’, and ‘No Clear Favorite’. Moreover, six of the 13 visits, or 46.15%, were in the most 
competitive races, labeled ‘No Clear Favorite’. In the 13 races visited by Democratic leaders, 
those individuals made only 21 appearances. To compare, the Republican leaders made 157% 
more visits—54 overall—than did the Democratic leaders. 
There could be several explanations for the lower frequency of visitations by the 
Democratic leadership. First, the Democrats have fewer leaders in this study. The Republicans, 
being the majority party in the House of Representatives, have the speakership, a position 
without a minority counterpart. Thus, if the Democratic leadership had three-quarters as many 
visits or if three-quarters as many districts were visited by Democratic leaders, then the 
difference in leadership numbers could explain the disparity. Taking the 37 districts visited by 
Republicans and the 54 visits in those districts into account, the Democrats would need to make 
41 visits in 28 districts. The Democrats actually made only 21 visits to 13 districts. Thus, the 
differences in the number of leaders cannot be an explanation for the differences in leadership 
visits. 
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Another explanation for the disparity in leadership visits could be that the Democrats do 
not see value in its leaders visiting the open seat districts. Focusing on the visits to the 12 most 
competitive races, in which Congressional Quarterly could not determine a favorite, can 
qualitatively examine the value of leadership visits. Within these 12 races, both parties’ leaders 
combined to visit ten races. The Republican leadership visited all ten, while the Democratic 
leadership visited six. The Republicans won nine of the 12 races. The Democrats failed to visit 
four districts visited by Republicans. The Republicans won all four of these races; however, on 
average the Republican candidate only received 53.74% of the vote. The races were considerably 
close, and the Democratic leadership failed to appear. Of the three races the Democrats did win, 
they visited two of them and the third race was not visited by either party. More significantly, the 
other district not visited by either party was the 2002 race in the at-large district in South Dakota. 
The Republican winning this seat, William Janklow, received less than 54% of the vote. 
Within the races visited by the Democratic leadership, the Republican candidate did win 
four races. In one of these races, the Republican candidate received more than 60% of the vote, 
an exception to that level of competitiveness. Aside from this race, the average Republican 
margin of victory was only 2.9%. This shows that while the Democrats did not win the races, 
these races were among the closest in the country. The leadership visits in these races could have
added to the increased competition. It is not clear how much a leadership visit will benefit a 
candidate or a candidate’s chance of winning a race. Nor is it clear whether one party benefits 
more from leadership visits than another. The leadership visits may very well make a race closer 
than it would be without such visits. One could criticize this relationship by claiming that leaders 
simply visit more competitive races, instead of the visits making races more competitive. 
However, the evidence clearly shows that the Republican Party, visiting more districts and 
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having more visits to those districts resulted in three times as many wins than Democrats in the 
races in which Congressional Quarterly deemed there to be ‘No Clear Favorite’.
The data also show a stark difference between the party spending in 2002 and that in 
2004. As Table 7 shows, the party spending in 2004 drastically increased over the levels in 2002. 
Spending in open seat races increased over $25 million dollars from one election cycle to the 
next. Most significantly, the spending per open seat race increased even more dramatically. 
There were 14 more races in 2002 than in 2004. From 2002 to 2004, total party spending 
increased from just under $3 million to more than $28 million—an increase of 800.7%. 
Similarly, party spending increased by nearly $900,000 per race on average—an increase of 
1221.0%. Obviously, these increases between the two years both in party
Table 7
Combined Party Spending in Open Seat Races
Year Total Spending # of Races
Spending per 
Open Seat 
Race
2002 $3,162,468 44 $71,874
2004 $28,484,595 30 $949,487
Total $31,647,063 74 $427,663
Source: FEC
spending and party spending per race between the two years are not insignificant increases that 
can be attributed to chance. Instead, such increases need a more qualitative explanation.
There are many reasons explaining drastic increases in party spending from one election 
year to the next. First, an increase in competitive races in 2004 could lead to an increase in party 
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spending. If the party sees that more open seat races are more competitive during an election 
cycle, then they will send more funding to those races. The data, however, paint a different 
picture of race competitiveness between the two years.  There were 28 races in 2002 labeled ‘No 
Clear Favorite’ or ‘Leans’ and only 12 in 2004. In 2004 there were 46.7% fewer races overall 
than in 2002. However, there were 57.1% fewer competitive races in 2004 than in 2002. Thus, an 
increase in the number of competitive races cannot be an explanation for the increase in party 
spending. 
It could be argued that the Presidential year could cause an increase in party fundraising 
and, in effect, party spending, in the same way it increases voter turnout. However, there are 
fundamental problems with this idea. First, during a Presidential year, while there tends to be 
more political involvement, that number mathematically could not account for the increase in 
party spending. According to a George Mason University study, voter turnout increased from 
40% in 2002 to 60% in 2004. This increase is due to individuals’ attention to the Presidential 
election. Thus, much of the additional fundraising that would occur due to this increase in 
political participation would be toward the motivating force during that year: the Presidential 
campaign. 
Another explanation for increases in party spending between two election cycles comes 
from the inflation rate. However, according to the Department of Labor, the inflation rate from 
2002 to 2004 was only 5.00%, far short of the increase in spending. 
Next, an increase in party spending from one election cycle to the next can come with the 
overall risk associated with the election. If the minority party has an opportunity to take over 
majority control of the House of Representatives, it is likely that party spending would increase, 
particularly in the naturally competitive open-seat races. This cannot explain the increase in party 
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spending in 2004. In 2002, the Republican party held a six-seat majority in the House. In 2002, 
the Republican advantage was 12 seats. Aside from the difference in the size of the majority, the 
2002 election was considered “too close to call” (Reddy 2002). In 2004, however, the only 
individuals discussing the possible Democratic takeover were the members of the Democratic 
leadership, and this effort was widely seen more as party cheerleading than a serious evaluation 
of the election outcome. In 2004, “there [were] few doubts over which party [would] control 
Congress” (Meek 2004). The risk of a majority party change was higher in 2002.
The day after the 2002 election, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), went into 
effect. While the act did limit soft-money donations and set higher limits on direct, hard-money 
donations, the act did little to affect party spending on behalf of candidates. Originally, the act 
did force the national party organizations to choose whether they would use independent or 
coordinated expenditures in support of a candidate during a campaign. However, in 2003, this 
clause of BCRA was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in McConnell, et al. v. 
Federal Election Commission, et al. Thus, the legislation’s only real effect on the parties was the 
removal of soft money donations. As Table 8 shows, this legislation resulted in an overall 
decrease in spending by the DCCC and the NRCC. The effect, then, should have limited the 
amount of party spending per open-seat race. However, open-seat races differed drastically from 
the average and saw a dramatic increase. Hence, the legislation does not explain the difference in 
spending, as the spending increased only in open seat races.
The most clear and logical explanation for the difference in party spending is the change 
in leadership and in priorities. From 2002 to 2004, the only individual who stayed in his or her 
position was Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert. House Whips, Republican Tom DeLay and
Democrat Nancy Pelosi, became Majority and Minority Leaders respectively in 2003.
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Table 8
Overall Party Spending in 2002 and 20041
2002 2004
Total NRCC 
Spending $204,010,188 $185,790,511 
Avg. NRCC 
Spending per Race2 $482,782 $427,104 
Total DCCC 
Spending $103,776,331 $92,703,542 
Avg. DCCC 
Spending per Race2 $238,566 $213,111 
1
 Source: Opensecrets.org
2
 Average spending is (Total spending)/435
Meanwhile, both parties elected new whips and new campaign committee chairs. Under this new 
leadership, it can be assumed that new priorities, styles, and agendas could result in a change in 
party spending. In coherence with this theory, Nancy Pelosi and Tom Delay, throughout 2003 
and 2004, worked tirelessly with their respective congressional campaign committees on open-
seat special elections in Kentucky and South Dakota. These types of races functioned as the keys 
to their legislative success. 
The best explanation for the difference in spending is the difference in leadership styles. 
In 2002, Republican and Democratic floor leaders, Dick Armey and Dick Gephardt had served in 
their positions for several congresses, offering the same leadership styles. The new-blood, trying 
to empower their parties given their new positions, chose to focus on open-seat races as their 
keys to increased political power. 
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Case Studies
Human behavior is a complex and dynamic variable to measure. Electoral behavior is just 
as complicated. The choice of which candidate to choose is often made on a voter-by- voter basis. 
One speech, one handshake, even one television commercial can determine a vote. Voter 
preference extends from any of thousands of variables, and short of a voter-by-voter interview 
within a district, it is impossible to know why any given individual back a certain candidate. As 
thus, this model does not attempt to explain every dynamic that occurs a race. This study 
examines one general type of variable (leadership), on a specific type of race (open seats). The 
money that the leadership directs to House elections is overwhelming. Some candidates will see 
millions of dollars pour into their district from the congressional campaign committees in 
Washington, DC. This study has begun to examine the influence that the leadership has on races. 
The data have shown that certain types of spending and fundraising is quite valuable. Moreover, 
while visits by the House leadership do not have statistical significance, the qualitative 
examination of the data shows striking differences between the two parties. Whereas the 
influence of leadership through campaign visits and congressional campaign committee spending 
has been overlooked by scholars up to this point, this study shows that an influence does exist
and that future research offers the opportunity for even greater findings. 
Like most statistical models, there exist cases that fail to fit the model perfectly. At the 
same time, other cases clearly exhibit the relationships derived from the regression. Hence, case 
studies will examine races that fit the model and will observe the actual data that function to 
produce the result. Next, case studies will view the cases that did not behave as the model would 
expect and will investigate the other dynamics in the races that produced the unexpected result.
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The first case study shall focus on the race that did not fit the competitiveness variables. 
Congressional Quarterly’s measures of competitiveness were accurate in every race except one. 
In the 11th district of Georgia in 2002, CQ labeled the race as ‘leans Democrat’. However, Phil 
Gingrey, the Republican, won the race by over three percent. There must, then, be a dynamic not 
factored into the CQ rankings that explains the case. I begin with fundraising—a vital part of the 
CQ determination of competitiveness. This factor was probably the item that cursed the label. 
The Democrat in this race, Roger Kahn, raised $3,644,255. This figured dominates the 
$1,530,762 raised by Phil Gingrey. This figure would imply that the Democrat would benefit. In 
fact, according to this model, the more than $2.1 million advantage in Democratic spending
should have given the Democrat a  more than 11-point advantage. More to the point, the $23,071 
in DCCC coordinated spending is associated with an vote increase for the Democrat by 1.91% of 
the vote. By this measure, Roger Kahn should hold a nearly 13-point advantage. However, the 
Republican party spent money in the district as well. The NRCC spent $9,500 in direct funding, 
$16,766 in independent spending on behalf of the candidate, and the RNC spent another $71,000 
in coordinated spending. Republican party spending totaled $97,266 compared to Democratic 
party spending of only $23,321. While the model did not find statistical significance in the 
Republican party spending variables, it does not mean that in a given race, such a variable exacts 
no influence. In this case the money that the Republican leadership directed through the party 
committees could have made the difference. Add to this, House Speaker Dennis Hastert made a 
campaign appearance on behalf of Republican Phil Gingrey just four days before the election. 
This leadership appearance by the most powerful member of the House of Representatives may 
also have contributed to the success of the Republican.
50
Next, Phil Gingrey was a two-term Georgia state senator who may have benefited from 
better name recognition. However, as Georgia state senate districts are smaller than its national 
congressional districts, name recognition may have only been an issue in a small area of the 11th
district. 
Another more vital dynamic that may have influenced the election is the partisan makeup 
of the district. The new 11th district of Georgia is composed of many of the counties that 
composed the old seventh district. While the comparison is not exact, it is very close in size,
shape and composition. Prior to the 2002 election, the old seventh district of Georgia (the new 
11th district) sent Bob Barr to Congress four consecutive times. Bob Barr was a staunch Southern 
conservative whose election sheds light on the partisan and ideological composition of this area 
of the Peach State. During his eight years in Congress, Representative Barr received an average 
rating from the American Conservative Union of 98.5 with 100 being most conservative 
(Congressional Quarterly). His eight-year average rating from the American Civil Liberties 
Union was 9.75 with 100 being most liberal (Congressional Quarterly). Moreover, George W. 
Bush won the seventh district of Georgia by 21.8% in 2000 (www.polidata.org). In the end, the 
efforts of the Republican leadership, both through intense party spending and a last minute visit 
by the Speaker, coupled with the intense conservatism of the district, was enough to overcome 
the huge fundraising advantage by the Democrat Roger Kahn. 
The 2004 race in the 13th district of Pennsylvania offers an example of a race which 
followed both the expectations of the model in this study and the Congressional Quarterly
rankings. In this race, the Democrat Allyson Schwartz faced off against Republican Melissa 
Brown to take over the seat being vacated by Representative Joseph Hoeffel III. Allyson 
Schwartz enjoyed a major fundraising advantage. She raised over $4.5 million while Melissa 
51
Brown raised just over $1.9 million. This over $2.6 million dollar advantage, according to the 
model is associated with a 13.77% decrease in the dependent variable. Next, Allyson Schwartz 
received $45,444 in DCCC coordinated spending. This is associated with an increase the 
Democrat’s vote share by an additional 3.76%. According to the data thus far, Allyson Schwartz 
should benefit by 17.53%. Schwartz actually won the race by 15.04%. 
The Republican leadership did pour huge sums of money into the race. Combining 
NRCC independent and coordinated spending and NRCC spending against Allyson Schwartz, 
the leadership directed $2,345,938. The Democratic leadership spent $1,476,888 on the race. 
While the model was inconclusive as to the influence of these spending variables, it can be 
assumed that this $869,000 would benefit the Republican, Melissa Brown’s share of the vote, 
brining down Schwartz’ 17.53% advantage. Next, it is difficult to determine the partisan 
advantage in this district. In 2002, the Democrat Joseph Hoeffel was elected to a third term. His 
interest group ratings were very liberal. The American Civil Liberties Union’s average rating of 
Congressman Hoeffel’s first four years in office was an 87.5 out of 100 (Congressional 
Quarterly). Similarly, the American Conservative Union gave Hoeffel a four-year average of 4 
out of 100 (Congressional Quarterly). While this would appear to benefit the Democrat, Hoeffel 
won the 2002 election with only 51% of the vote (Capitol Advantage, 94). The Democrat may
only have a slight benefit based solely on the partisan makeup of Pennsylvania’s 13th. 
In the end, the dominance in fundraising was the key to Allyson Schwartz’ success. There 
were no visits from the House leadership from either party. Thus, that variable exacted no 
influence. The model showed with reasonable precision the benefits of the fundraising and the 
party spending in terms of the predicted vote outcome and the actual outcome. The difference of 
only 2.5% could easily be attributed to the possible influence of other spending variables. 
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A case study analysis of the data also shows an important finding regarding an absence of 
party spending. When one party fails to spend money in a race, and more importantly, when both 
parties’ leadership fail to direct money in a race, it does not signify a lack of interest in the race. 
In fact, a lack of spending shows that the leadership has considered the race settled, such that 
their money, visits and prestige will exact little or no influence on the outcome in the race. This 
situation brings another dynamic that occurs in open seat House races. While a powerful 
incumbent can enjoy little meaningful or no competition when seeking reelection, part of that 
assured electoral success comes not necessarily from the typical incumbent advantages. Some 
districts, due to ideological composition, naturally vote for a single party. For example, the 
Republican Congressman, Spencer Bachus, from the rural sixth district of Alabama may have 
received 90% of the vote in the 2002 election partly because of his five-term incumbency. 
However, the widely-accepted conservatism of the rural South makes it difficult for a 
contemporary Democrat to fare well in an election. 
In 2004, there was an open seat race in the fourth district of South Carolina, as incumbent 
Congressman Jim DeMint sought election to the United States Senate. Neither the Democratic or 
Republican leadership directed party money to the race. No member of the House leadership 
visited the race. In fact, the total fundraising for the race was just over $500,000, less than a 
quarter of the average fundraising per race. This conservative district in northwestern South 
Carolina elected Jim DeMint three times. In the 2002 election, Congressman DeMint garnered 
nearly 70% of the vote (Capitol Advantage, 82). During his first two terms, Jim DeMint received 
an average rating from the American Civil Liberties Union of 13 out of 100, while the American 
Conservative Union bestowed a rating of 97.75 out of 100 on him over the same period of time. 
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The district is unmistakably conservative, and the 2004 election displays the strength of that 
ideological lean. 
As the leadership for both parties failed to involve themselves in the race and very little 
fundraising occurred, ceteris paribus the race should have been reasonably close. The 
Republican candidate, Bob Inglis, raised only $503,834. Meanwhile, Brandon Brown, the 
Democrat, raised a meager $15,842. According to the results of the model, this fundraising is 
associated with an advantage for the Republican of 3.56%. In reality, Republican Bob Inglis won 
by a more than 41% margin—70.66% to 29.34%. What this situation shows is that a striking 
difference in the vote outcome is best attributable to the partisan leaning of the fourth district of 
South Carolina. A conservative, Republican-dominated district naturally will benefit a 
Republican seeking election, even without an incumbent advantage.
The race in the third district of Missouri in 2004 offers an extremely insightful case study 
when understanding the dynamics that can enter a race. The third district of Missouri was being 
vacated in 2004 by the retirement of the former Democratic Floor Leader and 14-term 
Congressman Richard Gephardt. The race saw two reasonably strong candidates face off. The 
Republican party fielded a popular author and pro-life proponent, Bill Federer, who enjoyed 
name recognition from challenging Congressman Gephardt in the 1998 and 2000 elections
(www.federer04.com). The Democratic party ran Russ Carnahan, whose father was elected 
governor of Missouri and then Senator after dying in a place crash weeks before the election. His 
mother was appointed to fill the Senate seat. His grandfather was a United States Congressman, 
and Russ Carnahan himself was a two-term member of the Missouri House of Representatives, 
serving as chair of the Democratic Caucus (www.russcarnahan.com). The Republican leadership 
directed no money to the race, nor did any member of the Republican House leadership visit the 
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district on behalf of Bill Federer. Similarly, no member of the Democratic House leadership 
visited the third district of Missouri during the campaign. However, the popularity and influence 
of Congressman Gephardt, could have played a beneficial role for the Democratic candidate. The 
Democratic leadership spent only $8,500 in direct expenditures on the campaign. 
The race in the third district of Missouri in 2004 produced a remarkable result in 
fundraising. In effect, the Republican and Democratic candidates raised exactly the same amount 
of money. Federer, the Republican, raised $1,352,598. Carnahan, the Democrat, raised 
$1,352,579—a difference of only $19. According to the model, the Republican fundraising 
should have increased the Republican’s share of the vote by 9.53% while the Democrat’s 
fundraising should have decreased the Republican’s share of the vote by 8.11%. The result is a 
net gain by the Republican by 1.42%. Arguably, the Democrat enjoyed better name recognition, 
coming from a dynasty of Missouri politics, while his opponent had never held elected office. 
And while Russ Carnahan likely received a type of coattail effect from the incumbency of Dick 
Gephardt, in this case, name recognition and previous experience were the dynamics most likely 
to deliver a Democratic victory. The third district of Missouri composes the southern suburbs of 
St. Louis and is likely a moderate district that would not benefit either candidate significantly, in 
terms of partisan composition. Between 1979 and 2002, Congressman Gephardt’s average 
ranking from the American Civil Liberties Union was 64.92 out of 100, showing that they listed 
him as somewhat moderate. Moreover, when Congressman Gephardt was first elected and before 
he rose to the popularity of a member of the House leadership in the mid 1980s, the American 
Conservative Union gave him and average rating of 21.56 out of 100. 
The vote results for the third district race favored the Democrat, Russ Carnahan, 53.98% 
to 46.02%. By some accounts, a nearly 8% victory may be a sound win. However, in a race 
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where the Republican leadership failed to visit the district or direct any spending from the 
congressional campaign committees, one must wonder whether doing so would have turned the 
tides of the race. True, the Democrat enjoyed greater name recognition, but the Republican 
candidate proved a be a truly competitive fundraiser, for which a leadership visit would have 
benefited in two ways. First, a leadership visit almost always comes in the form of a fundraiser 
that would have brought money to the Federer campaign. Second, a visit by a leader may have 
motivated prospective donors to give money to Bill Federer as the campaign and political 
ambitions of the candidate would be validated by a Washington powerbroker. Instead, a 
moderate district in a swing-state was given the same attention by the Republican leadership that 
a conservative district in a former Confederate state received. 
Conclusions
This study does not attempt to explain every influence in open-seat House races. 
However, the study uses several dynamics to examine what affects the vote outcomes in races for 
seats in the House of Representatives. Open-seat races in the House create an interesting 
situation for a researcher. As the reelection rate of House incumbents is well over 90%, open-
seat races naturally remove the benefits that incumbents enjoy. While open-seats have been 
studied in the past, most researchers have ignored the influence that House leaders have on these 
races. While this ignorance of such an effect can be attributed to an assumption that House 
leaders exert direct power only over incumbents, the case is not true. House leaders direct the 
congressional campaign committees to spend money where necessary. As a result, the House 
leaders exert influence over the money that will be infused into a race. Moreover, a qualitative 
56
examination of the benefits of a visit by a House leader can also show its effects on the vote, 
particularly in a race without an incumbent. 
Furthermore, the 2002 and 2004 elections create a prime situation with which to evaluate 
the effect of the 2003 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act. The 2002 and 2004 races are 
based on the same congressional districts. The races in 2002 were based on the older campaign 
finance laws; the 2004 races were forced to abide by the new law. 
The funding of elections both in terms of party spending and candidate spending is a 
multi-million dollar business. Spending comes from both parties in many different forms. The 
money can be used to fund independent efforts or it can be coordinated with the campaign to best 
serve its needs. Spending can also be specifically used against the opposing candidate. 
This study uses the 2000 study by Charles Bullock and Ronald Keith Gaddie as a general 
framework for a study of open seat House races. It differs, however, from Bullock and Gaddie
(2000), as it focuses on a model that examines the effects of leadership both in the forms of visits 
and directed party spending on the two-party vote. First, the study uses the Congressional 
Quarterly measures of competitiveness. The model shows that this measure is extremely 
accurate in predicting which party will win a race as well as a range in which the vote will fall. 
The measures take into account several dynamics of the election process, including fundraising 
and candidate quality. The results show that CQ called every race designated ‘Safe Republican’, 
‘Safe Democrat’, and ‘Leans Republican’ correctly. It only called one race labeled ‘Leans 
Democrat’ incorrectly. As expected, the margin of victory decreased as competitiveness 
increased. Moreover, this study introduces a method of controlling for competitiveness in the 
face of redistricting. It allows the researcher greater choice in case selection and more freedom in 
the scope of the study. Rather than only being able to examine cases from a 2002-2010, a 
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researcher can examine trends over a period of time concurrent with the existence of 
Congressional Quarterly competitiveness rankings.
As fundraising was a factor in determining competitiveness and the fundraising variables 
in the model did not reach statistical significance, removing the competitiveness variables from 
the model, it was assumed, would change the significance results for fundraising. The results 
show that they did. The fundraising variables became statistically significant and the signs were 
as expected, such that an increase in Republican fundraising increases the dependent variable—
the Republican share of the two party vote. Similarly, an increase in Democratic fundraising 
decreases the value of the dependent variable. 
Among the party spending variables, only one shows statistical significance: coordinated 
spending by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. This variable shows that a 
change in that variable results in a relatively high decrease in the dependent variable, with the 
sign as expected, negative. This is a significant finding. Not only is a type of party spending 
statistically significant, but its effect is quite large. The other party spending variables may lack 
significance because of too few data points under those specific types of spending. 
From a more qualitative perspective, the data do show some interesting facts about 
leadership visits and overall spending. First, the leadership visits showed that the Republican 
House leaders were far more dedicated to hitting the road and stumping for candidates in open-
seat House races. These individuals who represent the strength of the Congress and who set the 
legislative agenda for the United States, busy themselves with visits to individual congressional 
districts. Republican leaders seemed to plan effective visits to districts that were both 
competitive and ones in which the Republican party was thought to have a reasonable chance of 
electoral success. The Democrats, on the other hand, participated less zealously in campaign 
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visits. Even in the most competitive races, those labeled ‘No Clear Favorite’ the Democrats only 
visited half of the districts. These races, arguably represented the races in which Democratic
leadership neglect could likely translate to a Democrat’s loss. 
Next, overall party spending in open-seat races showed important results, particularly in 
the context of the new campaign finance law. What the data show is that from 2002 to 2004 the 
total spending of the DCCC and the NRCC for all races decreased. However, party spending per 
open-seat race dramatically increased. The data show that dynamics must be at play motivating 
the leadership to fund heavily open-seat races. As Herrnson described open-seats to be the only 
elections that are naturally competitive, the new House leaders seem to put those words into 
action. Leaders DeLay and Pelosi and then congressional campaign committee chairmen 
Reynolds and Matsui seem to place greater emphasis on open seat races as a key to electoral 
success. Every election brings distinct drives to a House leader: protect your majority or win a 
majority. It seems that in 2004, both the Republican and Democratic leaders saw open seat races 
as the most important forums to meet or actively work toward their goals. 
The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 was effective in its objective to 
stop soft money fundraising. This limit, in effect, led to a decrease in overall spending by the 
party organizations. However, open seat races saw a dramatic increase in party spending, and an 
even greater increase in average spending per race. The campaign finance law did not cause this
change in party spending; instead, it seems the cause was a drastic shift in leadership style. 
In the end, this study shows that in campaigns just like in the halls of Congress, the 
House leadership is not to be ignored. The people who are elected by their colleagues to control 
the function of the House of Representatives also dictate much of what goes into the campaigns. 
While individual candidate fundraising was statistically significant, the leaders directed large 
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sums of money to be spent on the campaigns in 2002 and 2004. On average, parties spent
hundreds of thousands of dollars on each race between the two years. While only one of the 
spending variables registered statistical significance, it is by no means a reflection of the lack of 
importance of party spending. Instead, it calls for greater research in the area. While the effect of 
the leadership’s direction of party spending has been ignored by scholars, this study should be a 
starting point for the future. Future elections should give more data points to examine whether 
other party spending variables attain statistical significance.
One of the resource limits to this study was the lack of information regarding the 
Presidential coattail effect. The effect of that the President can have, positively or negatively, can 
be an important element in the study of House races. The Bullock and Gaddie (2000) study 
examines the Presidential coattail effect. To measure the coattail effect during a midterm they 
examine the Presidential voting by congressional district in the last Presidential election. During 
a Presidential election year, they use that year’s voting data. For this study, this method would 
not be accurate. For two reasons, one should use the congressional district voting data for the 
2004 Presidential election. First, the congressional districts in the 2000 Presidential year were 
reconfigured after the 2000 census. As a result, the congressional districts in 2002 are 
incomparable to those in 2000. Second, the issues most important to voters in the 2002 election 
were closer to those at issue in the 2004 Presidential election, rather than the 2000 Presidential 
election. Issues such as national and international security and war were not at the forefront for 
voters in November 2000. Conversely, they were some of the most important issues in 2002 and 
2004. As a result, a future study should incorporate the effects of the Presidential coattails, as is 
done by the Bullock and Gaddie (2000) study, with the aforementioned adjustments because of 
the specific issue dynamics of the 2002 and 2004 election cycles.
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Moreover, future research should examine the leadership styles. If the styles of the House 
leaders should remain the same, as the same Majority and Minority leaders from the 2004 
election were reelected to their posts in the 109th Congress and the emphasis remains on open-
seat races, it will be telling of the political-electoral preferences of these individuals. It will show 
consistency in style and a conviction in the importance of open seat races to the overall success 
of Congressional electoral pursuits. It will further add credence to the theory that the emphasis 
on open-seat elections comes from a personal preference of the leaders, rather than another 
political dynamic solely affecting the 2004 congressional election cycle.
In the end, the House leadership does affect the vote. Such an effect has been illustrated 
both statistically and qualitatively. As expected and more specifically, money matters in open 
seat House elections. Party spending has been shown to exert influence. Moreover, candidate 
fundraising is critical in winning open seat House races. While not a perfect predictor, and its 
influence for each party differs, a fundraising advantage often signifies the winner. Overall, what
it means is that the wealthier a candidate’s campaign, coupled with a closer relationship with the 
House leadership and the congressional campaign committees, will produce a greater likelihood 
of winning a House race. In a sense, for races in which no candidate wields the advantage of 
incumbency, it still remains a connection to Washington that may seal the deal.
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